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Politik	denn	Kritik	an	Europa	sind.	Sie	 spiegeln	 so	vielmehr	die	Dilemmata	wider,	 vor	denen	
die	Politiker	nach	dem	Fall	des	„Eisernen	Vorhangs“	standen	und	auf	die	die	EG	aufgrund	ihrer	
Eigenrepräsentationen	und	Sprachregelungen	in	nur	eingeschränkter	Weise	reagieren	konnte.
A widely used commonplace declares the European Union to be an entity sui	generis. 
This is not only due to the very particular founding and developmental history of the 
EU, but also because to many its foreign policy seems erratic. This invited many to 
criticise this foreign policy and ascribed different representations to the EU, despite the 
EU’s efforts to develop its own representations of Europe. I use here the concept of re-
presentation1 not only because the EU uses it to ‘represent’ itself while negotiating with 
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non-EU actors, but also because these representations operate inwards while establishing 
regimes of what can be said publicly. The Union conceives itself as a space of democracy, 
freedom and human rights; therefore, it cannot use quasi dictatorial compulsion vis-à-vis 
its unruly member states – as the current debates regarding the international debt crisis 
demonstrate. Representations establish regimes of thinking and sayability. As for legal 
practitioners, the same principle applies to politicians: one could not step back from 
what was once written down, especially in institutionally highly sensitive, complicated 
organisms such as the EU. In this sense, paper is not only patient but also a memory 
focused on permanence. Hence the main focus is not on the actors as such (i.e. which 
group intermingles with which), but rather what they discuss. Why, how and for what 
reason do they talk about the EU? For example, in the enlargement debates employed 
here as examples, the two options enlargement/integration vs. non-enlargement needed 
to be explained. This is also done with the help of representations of Europe; actually one 
could go as far as to suggest that in the long run, representations of Europe were emplo-
yed as a means to forestall the entry of Southern Mediterranean states into the Union.
To exemplify how the representations of Europe intermingle with joint actions in foreign 
policy, this article turns its attention to two major debates during the 1990s: the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the 2004 enlargement – or Eastern enlargement, as it 
is called more often. Each was selected because it stands for two different ascriptions 
critics use to describe the common foreign policy of the Union: the concept of ‘Europe 
as Empire’ (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and the ‘Fortress Europe’ (the 2004 
enlargement). This means that the two different strategies were labelled in a negative way 
by their critics to delegitimize them in a way that racist ascriptions were allegedly used 
to denounce people of a different origin. These critics were mainly human rights groups 
as well as non-governmental organizations concerned with migration issues. Their issues 
connected them with different left wing groups in Europe. Both processes illustrate the 
different political means that were used to expand the influence of the EU. In the nego-
tiations that accompanied them, the EU had to reflect about its role in the world, the 
representation of its policies and about its self-representations. They were interconnected 
with a range of global problems such as migration, the economic North-South divide, 
terrorism, trade relations and democratic deficits. But while these issued touched upon 
unequal common interests, the specific, more regional interests of the different member 
states played a more important role, such as Spain’s, Italy’s and France’s interests in the 
Mediterranean region and those of Germany and Austria in Eastern- and Central Euro-
pe. With regard to the Union as a whole, one might ask whether the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership could be classified as a first attempt to develop an imperial foreign policy.2 
Likewise, one may regard the Eastern enlargement as an attempt to revise the borders, as 
an initiative to close the walls of fortification, since this was the furthest expansion ima-
ginable for conservative protagonists. Therefore the projects reflect the diverse local and 
2	 Cf.	 G.	Vobruba,	 Das	 politische	 Potential	 der	 Europäischen	 Nachbarschaftspolitik.	 Zur	 Überwindung	 des	Wider-
spruchs	zwischen	Integration	und	Erweiterung	der	Europäischen	Union,	in:	Leviathan	8	(200)	,	45-6,	esp.	48f.
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regional interests of different member states. Furthermore, the Nineteen Nineties are a 
period during which the EU sought to define what Europe is and what represents it. For 
many of the actors it remained unclear for a long time which countries could enter the 
Union and which could not. Spain for its part pushed for the accession of Morocco and, 
in case this would not happen, for deeper cooperation between the Union and Morocco. 
Simultaneously the Spanish interests had to be consistent with the traditional Mediter-
ranean policy of the Community. The Eastern Enlargement, however, was regarded as a 
way to turn the Union into a global player by creating the biggest single market in the 
world and thus a new economic superpower. Both projects were not mutually exclusive 
and even complemented each other, yet financial questions and the unclear foreign po-
licy approach of the Union rendered both projects antagonistic. Precisely this inherent 
antagonism makes it so worthwhile to examine these processes for the representations 
of Europe. This is because the European Commission – as the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’ 
– could use a stalemate to call for more competences, especially because it possessed the 
formal right to propose new accession candidates.3 Especially during the Eastern Enlar-
gement the EU, and the Commission in particular, claimed to be speaking on behalf of 
Europe as a whole. It became increasingly difficult for non-European states to play off 
one member state against another and make them exponents for another Europe, as had 
been attempted by Donald Rumsfeld in 2003.
However this article does not seek out the finality of European foreign policy. It is merely 
interested in these two particular projects and the representations of Europe articulated in 
both of them by European politicians as well as the two aforementioned catchwords. The 
presumption is that for politicians and bureaucrats at the level of the Commission and 
in other institutions of the EU, the self-image of being an Empire seemed rather absurd. 
This has both historical and cultural reasons. At the same time there was an undercurrent 
in its policies that could be perceived as being imperialistic. Conversely, one may pose 
the question as to the continuities regarding the imperial self-portrayal in the different 
member states. But the ambivalence can be explained by the circumstance that for the 
EU as a whole and especially in the European Parliament (EP), the concept of Empire 
carried extremely negative connotations. Nonetheless some politicians demanded – and 
still call for –a more active foreign policy of the Union combined with a stance of global 
dominance.4 These ambivalences are also part of this investigation. The differences, but 
also the commonalities, between both projects will help to clarify the development of the 
representations of Europe vis-à-vis the European borders and the non-European states 
during the Nineteen Nineties. It is important to ascertain that these antitheses describe 
different courses of action both for the Community as a whole and of use for the interests 
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ring the examined period was shaped by many ambivalent factors. For instance, up until 
1990 it was made very clear to Morocco that it could never become part of the EU. Then 
again, Spanish politicians were not the only ones who came to stress the similarities in 
the Mediterranean and the common ‘civilising’ values of a Europe that is precisely more 
than a mere geographical definition.5 
This much can be said in advance: There was at least one major change in the represen-
tations during the period under consideration. Whereas different actors of the European 
Community made clear statements for a more active and dominant foreign policy in 
1995, at the end of the decade statements pertaining to delimitation, inner reforms and 
consolidation of the EU came to the foreground. But this is not congruent with what 
critics understand under the term ‘Fortress Europe’. Due to its self-representations the 
EU cannot deviate from the image of being an attractive centre of the world. This brings 
us to the question of the way in which representations could be employed as a resource 
for political action and legitimization. Representations of Europe in this particular con-
text will be understood in this sense – as political resources – as they shaped the mode of 
understanding of the European elite.6
Both catchwords gained publicity because they denote two different trends in European 
politics. For one, it can be said that since its beginnings, the history of the European 
Union is – in one way or another – linked to the concept of Imperium.7 Established as an 
alternative to founding an empire after the destructive experiences of the first half of the 
twentieth century (especially the two world wars), in the Nineteen Nineties a number of 
academics, politicians and political activists came to classify the European Union itself as 
such. They understood empire loosely as an entity which strove to influence politics be-
yond its borders without the use of direct force, but instead a combination of economic 
measures, military threat and ideology. Especially the last point makes the EU so vulne-
rable, as one of its representations is that of being just a “civic-normative power”8, a self-
portrayal that ironically was developed to counter any criticism of being an empire. So 
Empire became a highly ambivalent concept for the European Union. Just how proble-
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Osterhammel’s definition in his article on models of Europe and imperial contexts: “An 
Empire is a spacious, hierarchically structured governing association (Herrschaftsverband) 
of polyethnic and multireligious character, whose coherence is ensured by threads of 
violence, administration, indigenous collaborators as well as a universalistic programme 
and the symbolism of an imperial elite (mostly with a monarchical centre), but not 
through social and political homogenization and the idea of a universal citizenship.”9 
Likewise Herfried Münkler: “Empires and state systems differ […] in that the first pacify 
the internal space and do not admit violent struggles of interests, neither over political 
legitimacy nor legislative issues.”10 However it is necessary to point out that members 
of the European Commission as well as other European politicians rarely combined the 
representation of Europe with the concept of Empire, in constrast to the beginning of 
the century, as is shown in Christian Methfessel’s article. Besides the aforementioned 
employment of the term Empire in a critical sense, there was a second concept of Empire 
which seemed more appealing to the politicians as a positive example for the Union: the 
concept of the peaceful multiethnic empire. Two examples were mentioned: the Holy 
Roman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They became models not only in the 
debate around Mitteleuropa but were also regarded as historic prototypes around which 
the European Union could be constructed and with which it could legitimize itself. Also, 
during the 1990s the EU tried to detach itself from any imperialistic policies akin to 
those of the USA. 
Often one finds evidence for the belief that national affairs are shaped by notions of 
Europe. An idealistic reading tends to take Europe as a model example and a point of 
reference. However this article assumes that representations of Europe are more than 
merely a source for legitimization in the political arena. They establish regimes of what 
can be said (Sagbarkeitsregime). In the early Nineteen Nineties the then EC operated 
with representations of Europe it needed to revise up until the end of the century. These 
representations seduced it into seeing enlargement as a necessary historical process, be-
cause on the one hand the EU is attractive and on the other it would emerge stronger 
and better out of every enlargement round as well as every crisis. But this leads to a 
kind of circulus	vitiosus: due to the enlargement the EU is criticised as an empire. The 
EU reacts by trying to amend its foreign policy. But this does not adequately describe 
the actual situation around 2000, because rather than changing the foundations of its 
foreign policy, the EU preserved many of its aspects. And this comes into conflict with 
the imperialistic traditions of some member states during the Nineteen Nineties. Both 
the EU and its member states develop their policies and self representations in interplay 
with each other. Actions of some member states which contradict the representation of 
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the whole provoke criticism. Moreover, the Commission is compelled to react to the 
policies of member states running counter to the community’s self image, particularly if 
it wants to assert its claim to leadership. With regard to the central concept of the title, it 
must be noted that while the term empire in one way or another (be it as delineation) ac-
companied the history of the EU since its beginnings and was sometimes given a positive 
connotation by some actors during its revival in the Nineteen Nineties1990s, this was 
not the case with the concept of the ‘Fortress Europe’.11 One can differentiate between 
four different implications of the term. First, it has a high profile owing to the conno-
tations evoked by the use of the term during the Second World War. Second, it alludes 
to an allegation made by the United States after the end of the Cold War, namely that 
the Union wanted to wall off its single market. Third, it is used in conjunction with the 
measures the European Union takes to stop South-North migration into the territory of 
the Union, something which keeps the topic in the media. And fourth, ‘Fortress Europe’ 
was employed as a counter-concept to the ‘Europe in Diversity’12.
This applies to the groups of actors who brought this term into play in particular. On 
one side there were states of the opinion that their accession was either unduly delayed 
or withheld. On the other there were activists who criticised the migration policy of the 
community; especially in the Mediterranean, with the symbol of the border fence around 
Ceuta and Melilla. This results in unfamiliar constraints for the self representations of 
Europe. A region that projects an image of economic success and acts outwardly as an 
advocate for human rights and democracy can hardly behave towards the neighbour re-
gions as a pure preventer with a new wall. How the EU reacted towards these challenges 
and if she adjusted her representations to a changed foreign policy is one of the central 


















that	‘the	 future	borders	of	 the	Union	must	not	become	a	new	dividing	 line’.	 In	practice,	whilst	enlargement	
should	be	about	inclusion,	the	hard	border	regime	which	is	being	imposed	on	candidate	countries	is	about	
exclusion,	‘about	creating	or	recreating	dividing	lines	in	Europe’.”
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1. The Nineteen Nineties: The stage for the EU as a global actor
After the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ the global general framework changed fundamentally 
for the EU. The Commission used this new situation to develop its own profile, steeped 
in by the understanding for a historical challenge. Because of the unclear global political 
situation after 1990 the EU stood for a multipolar world order with a focus on inter- and 
supranational institutions – a consequence of what was believed to be one’s own success 
story.13 Never before in history had the representation of Europe as a space of freedom 
and liberty seemed more fulfilled than in the beginning of the Nineteen Nineties. The 
EU improved, for example, its relations with the ASEAN states and provided institutio-
nal aid to model this and other organisations according to its own image.14 After the end 
of the ideological bloc formation new markets could be developed in a totally different 
dimension.15 At the same time the Yugoslav Wars (and Ruanda) demonstrated the EU’s 
powerlessness in foreign affairs. Because military action was hardly conceivable for the 
Union – a consequence of the representations under discussion – new concepts of neigh-
bourhood policy became the main focus beyond direct crises; new concepts without 
the ultimate aim of admission to the EU: strategies such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. What was new and exceptional about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
was that it combined multi- and bipolar agreements at the same time; and the success of 
the project depended on this combination. This was so because security and economic 
interests corresponded with each other and were an important issue in the enlargement 
debates.16 Both reflected problems were linked to the two central trajectories of the Eu-
ropean Community: enlargement and consolidation. But it is also clear that some single 
actors (e.g. the French government) during this time had far reaching ambitions regar-
ding the common foreign policy of the EU, as is demonstrated by the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) 1992. In 2001 this was followed by the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP, now the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)). 
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Union, to consolidate the international appearance that did not rest on arguments of 
an economic nature alone. It is worth noting in our context that organisations such as 
Frontex are not directly associated with these organisations. As a result the appearance 
of the EU vis-à-vis its neighbours remained polyphonic. The burden of the operation is 
shouldered by particular member states. In our case a relevant example would be Opera-
tion Hera, where Spain and Italy provide the ships but the costs are divided up among all 
the member states of the Union.17 These operations are among those which contribute 
to the image of the ‘Fortress Europe’ given that it is primarily a defensive foreign policy. 
This could be used as an argument against ‘Europe as Empire’ because the old member 
states disagreed over the matter of a long term effective rapid reaction force, and for the 
new member states of East and East Central Europe the entry into the NATO had prio-
rity. Because the relationship between NATO and EU remains unclear to this day the lat-
ter cannot simply employ the military power of the former and many EU member states 
eschew the financial burdens of the installation of a military parallel structure.18 This 
does not mean that the EC lacked a foreign policy before 1990, yet it consisted mainly 
of association agreements and development policies. This is of particular relevance be-
cause in the Nineteen Nineties the EU barely broadened its foreign policy tools. They 
remained the same instruments: association and multilateral agreements in combination 
with bilateralism.19 Admittedly, the Commission reacted to the changed circumstances 
in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit, where rules were defined for future member states, 
which also came to affect the representations of the Union. These so called “Copenhagen 
criteria” could be separated into three categories. First, an accession candidate has to 
fulfil the political criteria of “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. Second, the EU empha-
sized the economic criteria of „the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”. And 
third, the Acquis	communautaire, the “the ability to take on and implement effectively the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union”.20 So an affinity for formalized relations is characteristic of the EU’s 
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One could allege that over a long period the EU took the enlargement trajectory if 
the admittance of theses states seemed unproblematic. In light of the changing circum-
stances in the Nineteen Nineties the EU had to cope with totally new, different and 
diverse pleas for admission than had seemed plausible at the time of the Treaty of Rome 
or the Southern enlargement. The altered conceptual structure and the sheer number of 
member states that complicated the coordination process demanded reforms in the con-
solidation process. Two foreign affairs projects (dominant foreign actions and civilising 
mission) were developed in parallel during the enlargement but also mutually depended 
on each other. If the EU understood the changed global circumstances as an opportunity 
to expand ideologically and politically, it also conceived of the political situation as unse-
cure, even as threatening as is underlined by the strong emphasis placed on security issues 
and counter-terrorism in the Declaration of Barcelona.22 Thus globalisation during this 
period was not only an opportunity but also a potential menace. Against this threat the 
regions felt compelled to “defend their traditions and their identities”.23 
2. The EU and the Non-EU – The EU as actor
Against this background it becomes comprehendible that during the Nineteen Nineties 
the EU had a number of options regarding its foreign policy that partially overlapped 
with the interests of different member states but also with the self interests of the EU as 
an institution. Thus ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘Europe as Empire” are nothing less than two 
different paths of development for the EU as an institution that are not congruent with 
the enlargement debates used here as examples. Both could be related to older traditions 
that were dominant in the foreign policy of European states around 1900. Every now 
and then it seems that these imperialistic traditions of some member states effectively 
continued without interruptions. This is not only true for abstract large structures like 
the Commonwealth of Nations in the case of the United Kingdom and the francophonie 
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military interventions overstretching one’s own abilities could be seen as being part of 
this tradition.24 
A frequent point of criticism the EU and its institutions have to grapple with is the alle-
gation that its policies are corrupted by interests on every level – region, member state, 
EU. It appeared as though the foreign policy of the Union followed the national interests 
of single member states. In this reading the Eastern enlargements would come to benefit 
the North, e.g. Germany, while the Mediterranean partnership would be of use to the 
South, e.g. Spain. But on the level of the Union, the Commission was strengthened as 
the centre of the enlargement processes and the Union as a whole because it could ex-
pand its regional predominance and zones of influence. At the same time the institutions 
of the Union are also strengthened. But in the context of the Union national interests al-
ways have to be disguised with representations of Europe. No actor can formulate openly 
and officially on the level of the Union that a project serves its own interests alone, as this 
would lead to massive opposition and harsh reactions by the other partners. Besides the 
principle of compensation, which is at the roots of the peace-building founding ideals, 
this is based on the often articulated principle of (subsidiary) solidarity within the EU. 
Or to put it another way: Even if someone operating within the frame of global foreign 
policy in the 1990s had the idea of an ‘Empire Europe’ it could not be sold in the style 
of American foreign policy, as this would be incompatible with the self-representations 
of Europe – at least Europe had to appear as a model for the world. This tension is trans-
ferable onto the dichotomy under consideration here, namely between enlargement and 
integration, between ‘Europe as Empire’ and ‘Fortress Europe’. The origin of both terms 
does not lie in the self-descriptions of the EU but are primarily ascriptions. Admittedly, 
it applies to some statements of EU actors.25 It is interesting that while the EU justifies 
its power-political outreach with a better multipolar world order and the support of 
















26	 See	 work	 programme	 (Commission);	 Bulletin	 EU	 /2-200;	 http://europa.eu/archives/bulletin/en/20000/
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Accordingly, the idea of a strong Europe as the guarantor of a multipolar world order 
forms an important element in the representations of the European Union with regard 
to its foreign policy.27
Nonetheless specific positions of individual member states had to be taken into conside-
ration. In the presidency’s conclusions, the Seville European Council accepted the “tra-
ditional policy of military neutrality” of Ireland and promised “that this would continue 
to be the case after ratification of the Treaty of Nice”.28 Not only the consideration of 
political beliefs of single member states but also the lack of any common foreign policy 
as well as the multilateral orientation thwarted any dominant claim to power.29 This view 
remained prevalent despite the challenges the enlargement placed on the efficiency of 
the Union. At the same time the reference to the continuing weakness of the European 
Union underpins the assumption that the European Union is not in the position to 
be an imperialistic power – even if this were its desire. The only ‘imperialistic mission’ 
that the Union could have besides the propagation of a (social) market economy and 
the establishment of regional organisations would be the promotion of human rights. 
Indeed, this is an argument often mentioned in programmatic foreign policy statements; 
however, this position is not accompanied by forceful efforts towards this end in day to 
day policy. A hint to the problematic reality of any imperialistic policy is given by the 
calls for a stronger commitment in the realm of foreign policy,30 a fact underlined by the 
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3. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Like the Eastern Enlargement, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the result of 
local/regional interests of different member states. One can argue that the Euro-Me-
diterranean Partnership was a result of Germany paying off Spain in 1994 in order to 
implement the Eastern Enlargement. The connection to the EU as a whole was that the 
Southern member states feared Eastern Enlargement would alter the symmetry of the 
Union in favour of its Northern member states. But the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
was more than merely an attempt to save the Moroccan agricultural market for Spain. 
It was the first international effort for highly formalized and institutionalized coope-
ration with – by any definition – non-European states, which reached far beyond any 
previous exchanges of treaties and cooperation proposals. The EU had a list of specific 
goals it strove to accomplish through the partnership and some member states had vital 
interests in the cooperation with these close neighbours. The stabilisation of the region, 
countering the terrorist threat emanating from Islamic groups and of the cessation of 
South-North migration by enhancing economic growth in the Arab states were among 
its main purposes.31 
The foundation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership rested on several pillars. Besides 
the abovementioned global changes, economic interests such as the revival of the Me-
diterranean Policy of the Community played a role.32 But the main thrust of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership remained unclear. If one were to classify the (early failed) 
security cooperation as somewhere between ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘Europe as Empire’ 
the European Parliament’s main focus was on “benevolent, civil-normative” Imperia-
lism.33 As in the Eastern Enlargement the issue of human rights was also used vis-à-vis 
the southern Mediterranean states as an instrument to intervene in their internal affairs. 
During the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a number of Arab states deemed some of 
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as well as a neo-colonial act. Thereby these critics exposed a weak spot of the Union, 
since a number of political actors had called for a more imperialistic foreign policy of the 
Union in the past, which ran counter to the image the European Commission wanted to 
portray. These discussions of the 1990s are connected to the changes in the global situa-
tion after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. Already in early statements one can clearly trace 
an all-embracing approach as the Community felt responsible for the Mediterranean as a 
whole very early on in its history.34 In 1985 the Commission countered concerns of the 
Southern member states regarding an accession of Spain and Portugal with financial gua-
rantees. Here the geopolitical-regional strategic relevance is clearly visible.35 The prospect 
of negotiations with the EU was appealing for the Southern Mediterranean neighbours 
because a membership potentially seemed possible as the boundaries of the EU were not 
defined. It always remains unclear along which lines the borders of Europe run. Indeed 
the Treaty of Rome stated that every European state could become a member of the 
Community, but to this day the Commission refuses to fix the geographical borders of 
the continent36. This is clearly illustrated in a report of the Commission from 1992: “In 
the Commission’s view it would neither be possible nor expedient to fix the boundaries 
of the European Union now and for all times, as [the Union’s] outlines require longer 
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borders. But, as previously indicated, this vagueness leads to political conflicts over ob-
jectives. Beyond its territory the EU erects different border regimes by inspecting the 
trans-border regions compatibility with Europe. Even though the relevant official formu-
lations no longer differentiate between a ‘barbaric hinterland’ and ‘European’ regions (as 
around 1900) it nevertheless seems that there are concepts at play – from time to time 
different ones – which determine who may enter the Union and who may not. If one 
asks for the imperialistic path of the Union, it is necessary to record the commonalities 
and differences between both processes as the period of the decolonisation after 1945 
must be regarded as a fundamental break.38 
There were numerous different representations of Europe towards the “South”. On the 
one side the European Community styled itself as an economically successful region. 
More important – and with stronger imperialistic tendencies – was the pretence of repre-
senting a policy of democracy, human rights and peace-building.39 Although the Union 
emphasised the civilizational divide between ‘Europe’ and the ‘South’, this divide could 
be overcome by the ‘benevolent’ leadership of the Union. In this reading the “imperial 
border” is not the “zone that separates radically different strangers from each other” 
because the declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focuses on the common 
ground.40 How interwoven this was with the problem of migration and the avoidance of 





Under the impression of the discussion around ‘Fortress Europe’ the EU reacted with 
new strategies of its neighbourhood policies which had to take the changing circum-
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mission tried to avoid the impression of the EU as a fortress. This means that the EU 
did not wanted to bulkhead herself off but attempted to influence the environment in 
the South in a way that would minimize the migratory and security pressure and this 
region would become a smaller Europe, a small counterpart. Associated with this is a 
representation of Europe that is only hinted at in the statements of the EU but clearly 
visible in the Spanish documents. Here the EU is unquestionably the teacher that brings 
modernity to the South. One could criticise as imperialistic that the EU does not take 
different concepts and mentalities into account but that it tries to influence the processes 
according to its own liking. Indeed, by means of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
the EU sought to influence the conditions in the South in such a way that the migration 
stream would subside, yet this failed due to the actual implementation. The Southern 
Mediterranean neighbours gained more preferential quotas than other states but none-
theless they articulated a feeling that the Union wanted to seal off the Common Market, 
especially in textiles and agricultural products. So the perception of the EU as a fortress 
grew stronger during the EMP and intervention into the home domestic affairs of single 
states was regarded as imperialistic. Because the Commission as well as the Union did 
not understand the complaints and did nothing to resolve the tensions, the Euro-Medi-
terranean Partnership failed in the medium term.
4. The Eastern Enlargement of the European Community
How problematic debates around enlargement could become is demonstrated by the 
different terms used for the different accession rounds of the EC, especially when the of-
ficial terms are far from consistent in and of themselves. They are problematic insofar as 
they are associated with historical thought structures. This especially applies to the fifth 
enlargement round of the EU.43 Whereas 2004 Enlargement or Eastern Enlargement 
suggests neutrality, the German term Osterweiterung has more historical connotations. 
Especially some Polish saw the activism of some German groups as a renewal of the 
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stressed the aim of overcoming the European partition.44 Many politicians understood 
the Eastern Enlargement as an event that corrected the historical ‘error’ of the ‘Iron Cur-
tain’ and brought parts of Europe back into the boat of the European community. In the 
accession process the Central- and Eastern European candidates adopted the definition 
of a European identity as purported by the old member states – the ‘West’.45 The Eastern 
enlargement therefore was stylised as a duty of historical dimensions, without any hints 
to an imperialistic or defensive foreign policy.46 In this they continued older debates on 
the backwardness of Eastern Europe and the character of Europe as a model for reform 
there, as is demonstrated by Benjamin Beuerle for Russia after 1900 with regard to this 
issue. The dominant representation in view of the global position was the emphasis of the 
fact that with the accession of the Eastern European states the Union would be the big-
gest market of the world.47 It is only possible to call the behaviour towards the accession 
candidates imperialistic insofar as they have to fulfil the conditions of the EU completely. 
Imperialistic indeed are the imaginations of global power and values developed after the 
enlargement as well as –and this is the commonality between the Eastern Enlargement 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the civilising mission.
The enlargement supersedes the previous ‘walls’ of Europe, but towards the end of the 
millennium the EU begins to barricade itself off because the Community seems to be 
technically overburdened by the enlargement. Thus the EU does not become a fortress 
towards the migration streams but towards other states. Naturally it was clear for the 
Union that other states could interpret this big accession round as one last final acquisi-
tion project. The foremost goal was to create the biggest single market in the world and 
thereby strengthen the global importance of the Union. But because the Union draws an 
important part of its regional attractiveness from the potential entry into the Union and 
its global attractiveness from possible future alliances, any impression in the direction 
of a definitive closing had to be avoided. The “Joint Declaration: One Europe” of the 
“Final Act to the Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003” therefore proclaimed 











48	 Official	 Journal	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 2.09.200:	 Final	 Act	 to	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Accession	 to	 the	 European	
Union	 200,	 957-988,	 here	 97.	 Available	 via	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:200:26:0957:0988:EN:PDF.	
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But the accession complicated the foreign policy issue, as is demonstrated by the debates 
surrounding the Second Gulf War in 2003. The future member states of East Central 
Europe sided with the USA while old member states like France and Germany opposed 
military intervention. Even if the Union would have had a common position against 
American desires for military intervention, the problems of a common foreign policy 
would have become apparent by then. In this sense any common imperialistic foreign 
policy would have been impossible to implement. But also the ‘Fortress’ encountered its 
limits because Poland became a fervent advocate of future accession possibilities for other 
Eastern European states. This demonstrates that any foreign policy programme that may 
have existed would have reached its limits by now.
5. Conclusion
It is important to point out how often the EU emphasises that clear visions for a fo-
reign policy are still missing.49 Both ascriptions – ‘Europe as Fortress’ and ‘Europe as 
Empire’ fail both in reality as in the representations of Europe. Even if different groups 
of actors of the community came to use one of these ascriptions for their own goals, no 
group could enforce its own instrumentalisation of these representations. This is due 
to the character of the representations of Europe. Their foundations were laid in the 
Nineteen Fifties under circumstances that did not set boundaries for utopias because 
the reality was so unambiguous. This way a representation of an open, always receptive 
Europe without direct power-political interests outside of its common market could be 
articulated undisputed. It was not until 1990 that reality came to challenge these self-
conceptions. However by 1995 it was too late to reformulate these representations given 
that two major enlargement rounds had taken place since 1980. Especially the so-called 
Northern enlargement, which strengthened that block of the Community which was 
most interested in the Eastern enlargement, applied criteria the Community could not 
step back from. These ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ had already been formulated in a similar 
version before 1990. To change the general requirements at this point in time would be 
a too obvious manipulation of the game. Both ascriptions thus only reflect the concen-
trated representation of the EU-inherent processes: the ‘fortress’ stands prototypically for 
the consolidation and the ‘Empire’ for the enlargement. But therefore Empire is a badly 
chosen term. When Herfried Münkler stresses that one of the defining features Empire 
is the presence of soft borders, then this does not apply to the EU as it is enclosed by 
sovereign states. The only form that could be considered imperialistic is the civilising 
mission. While the foreign policy is a prerogative of the member states the EU could 
concentrate on internal projects. It is important to mention that to follow any imperial 
idea the centre must know what it wants and how to achieve it; only then something 
49	 See	e.g.	Commission	of	 the	European	Communities,	COM	(200)	04	final:	Wider	Europe	–	Neighbourhood,	
Brussels	200,	9.
7 | Andreas Weiß
like an expansive foreign policy comparable to that of an Empire becomes conceivable. 
But these clear visions are absent in the polyphonic EU. It may seem paradox in light of 
what has previously been mentioned, however the Union is too centralised and bureau-
cratically organised and manoeuvres within a world of established international law for 
“men on the spot” to be able to change a great deal. One problem is often forgotten when 
the foreign policy of the Community is flagged as imperialistic: the return of the nation 
state. The primary frame of reference for the EU – whether considered as a supra-, inter- 
or transnational institution – is the modern, Western nation state and not the Empire. 
The community had to cope with the resurgence of the nation state in Eastern Europe 
since the Nineteen Nineties and the permanent emphasis on this concept in the South. 
The time does not seem ripe for its efforts to build a multipolar world order with strong 
international institutions. 
Fortress is a term coined to criticise the different efforts of the EU to cope with the grow-
ing pressure in migration. For the self-representation of the EU it was crucial to portray 
itself as an economical successful area. This was connected with the desire to be attrac-
tive. But when during the Nineteen Nineties this attractiveness led to rising numbers of 
immigrants the EU tried to stop this. Because the fortress-military-metaphor could not 
be combined with the self-representations, the community tried to establish ties to the 
periphery through contracts and agreements to influence their political and economical 
development. But one should not conflate this with a classical imperialistic foreign po-
licy. Inside of the EU there was no consensus about what to do with the periphery. The 
conflicts and critical junctures of the enlargement debates of the Nineteen Nineties re-
sulted in increasing self-preoccupation and reflection of the Union. But even then, there 
were no political and financial dispositions towards turning the EU into a fortress.
That this process is still underway and intermediary results will always be disputed by 
one or another is best proven by the conflicts around the two projects displacing the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the 
Union for the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the article asked for the articulated represen-
tations by European politicians involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 
Eastern Enlargement as well as secondary literature which either connect the Union to 
the concept of Empire or not. It is claimed as a result that for politicians and bureaucrats 
involved at the level of the Commission or other institutions of the European Union, the 
self representation of being an Empire seemed rather absurd. This had historical as well 
as institutional reasons, for example the representation of Europe as the space of freedom 
and democracy and the emphasis of a non-violent foreign policy of the Union as a whole. 
But there are sometimes politicians from single member states who on occasion propose 
openly or indirectly politics that could be interpreted as imperialistic. Here one can ask 
for continuities of imperial representations in different member states. The differences 
but also the similarities between both articles (Christian Methfessel’s one and this one) 
clarify the evolution of representations of Europe vis-à-vis European border regions and 
non-European states.
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One could therefore conclude from the different programmes that after an idealistic be-
ginning these programmes were overtaken by reality. Just as the Eastern European states 
did not instantly become European in economic and judicial terms, the neighbours in 
the South did not become democratic and secure overnight either. So, the Union as a 
whole complied to a realpolitik and for that reason alone turned into an opponent of the 
United States. After the end of the Cold War the USA tried to defend their position as 
the last remaining superpower while the EU propagated a new multipolar world order 
dominated by supranational institutions. Although this was in some way also an ideo-
logical policy, the EU disliked the aggressive tone and the militant actions by which the 
USA strove to spread capitalism and democracy. It was impossible to implement any 
imperial or fortification policy in all its abrasiveness because no adequate representation 
of Europe could be instrumentalised in any consensual way. The big foreign policy ap-
proach to being at least a regional hegemonic power and to frame and advocate the poli-
cies of the neighbouring states (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) failed and the classical 
mechanisms of negotiation and institutional arrangements seemed to be overstrained 
by the enlargement. Thus after the completion of the accession of the new Eastern Eu-
ropean member states the EU halted any plans for further enlargement. Metaphorically 
speaking, this policy was more of a “snail shell” than a “fortress”. Among the reasons 
behind this development were an inconsistent foreign policy, the inability to convince 
the regimes in the Southern Mediterranean to adopt more far-reaching economic and 
political reforms, the obstructions the USA used to restrict EU foreign policy in the re-
gion as well as the resurgence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But institutional reforms 
around the treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the office of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy set the institutional foundations for a 
more active foreign policy in the future. How this foreign policy will appear with regard 
to the representations of Europe mentioned here remains to be seen, yet past examples 
strongly suggest that the Union will never resort to an active foreign policy such as the 
one of the USA. So to say, both concepts had no lasting effects on the representations of 
Europe, they – if they ever did – changed only momentarily the politics of the Union.
